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Abstract 
Since its introduction by Tuckman and Chang (Nonprofit Volunt Sector Q 20(4):445-460, 1991), the 
Hirschman-Herfindahl Index (HHI) has been widely adopted into the nonprofit literature as a precise 
measure of revenue concentration. This widespread adoption has been characterized by diverse 
composition, with the HHI's calculation being largely determined by the nature of the available data 
and the degree to which it contained disaggregated measures of revenue. Using the NCCS 990 Digitized 
Data, we perform an acid test on whether different HHI measures yield significantly different results. 
Four measures of revenue concentration--an aggregated measure based on three revenue streams, an 
aggregated measure separating government grants from other contributions, a more nuanced 
measure based on seven revenue streams, and a fully disaggregated measure based on thirteen 
revenue streams--are used to predict two dominant nonprofit financial health dimensions: financial 
volatility and financial capacity. Overall, our results show that aggregation in HHI measurement 
matters; aggregation often downplays relationships by influencing the significance levels and 
magnitudes of estimates in a non-trivial way. 
Keywords  
Revenue concentration, Hirschman-Herndahl Index, Nonprofit financial capacity, Financial volatility, 
Measurement 
Introduction 
Researchers have captured revenue diversification by calculating a Hirschman Herndahl Index (HHI). Its 
calculation has largely been determined by the nature of the available data and the degree to which it 
contained disaggregated measures of revenue. To that effect, the HHI calculation has included varying 
counts of revenue streams ranging from three, four, five, eleven, and thirteen, to as many as nineteen. 
Given its high degree of adoption and use in nonprofit research, this paper seeks to perform an acid 
test on whether the way the revenue diversification is calculated, that is, whether one uses more 
aggregated measures (three or four revenue streams) or more disaggregated measures (seven or 
thirteen revenue streams), influences the results in important ways. In other words, how sensitive is 
the Hirschman Herndahl Index when it is calculated using different counts of revenue aggregations? 
The concern here is that with aggregation, important information is lost -- information that can 
potentially alter estimations and predictions in non-trivial ways. 
Hirschman-Herndahl Index: Paternity and Adoption 
Independently posited by both Hirschman (1945, 1964) and Herndahl (1950) as a measure of trade and 
industry concentration or inequality, the HHI has been used in the calculation of concentration across 
various contexts, ranging from household wealth or income, merger analysis, rm outputs (Rhoades 
1993), to revenue concentration in both the public (e.g., Suyderhoud 1994) and nonprofit sectors (e.g., 
Calabrese 2011; Carroll and Stater 2009; Chang and Tuckman 1994; Chikoto and Neely 2014; Mayer et 
al. 2012; Tuckman and Chang 1991; Yan et al. 2009). The HHI is therefore regarded as a precise 
measure of concentration that takes into account the number of revenue streams and the distribution 
amongst them. 
Since its introduction into the nonprofit literature by Tuckman and Chang (1991), there has been a 
widespread adoption of the HHI. For instance, a basic google scholar search of the words revenue 
diversification AND nonprofit yields about 17,100 records where the words revenue, diversification, 
and nonprofit have been used or referenced within a single record. Alternatively, the word search of 
revenue concentration AND nonprofit yields 27,500 records. Bottom line; the topic of revenue 
diversification or its inverse, revenue concentration, has been and continues to be of keen interest to 
the study of nonprofit organizations financial environments (Chang and Tuckman 2010). Generally, the 
strategy of revenue diversification has been positively associated with financial stability (Carroll and 
Stater 2009; Greenlee and Trussel 2000; Hager 2001; Keating et al. 2005; Thomas and Trafford 2013; 
Trussel 2002; Tuckman and Chang 1991), and negatively associated with financial capacity building 
(Chikoto and Neely 2014; Faulk 2010; Foster and Fine 2007). As a result, various recommendations to 
nonprofit organizations have ensued surrounding revenue diversification and concentration. 
The HHIs widespread adoption as a measure of revenue diversification has also been characterized by 
wide composition. As a function of data availability (e.g., National Center for Charitable Statistic (NCCS) 
Core 990 Data versus NCCS Digitized Data), U.S.-based nonprofit researchers have tended to rely on 
three aggregated revenue sources - donative, earned, and investment income to calculate the HHI 
(e.g., Carroll and Stater 2009; Keating et al. 2005; Frumkin and Keating 2002). Others have used four 
revenue streams - donative income, earned income, government grants, and investment income (e.g., 
Yan et al. 2009); with some using five revenue sources very different from those used in Tuckman and 
Chang (1991) public support, program service revenues, dues and assessments, net fundraising 
income, and profits from the sale of inventory (e.g., Hager 2001). 
Where more comprehensive data was available, a handful of researchers have measured revenue 
diversification using more disaggregated revenue streams, ranging from as many as eleven (Calabrese 
2011), thirteen streams (Chikoto and Neely 2014), to nineteen revenue streams (Wicker and Breuer 
2013). Piquing our interest is that, although not the centerpiece of Chikoto and Neelys (2014) research, 
in their review of whether revenue concentration promoted nonprofit financial capacity growth, the 
authors observed that as the HHI became more comprehensive (calculated using three, four, or 
thirteen revenue streams), the coefficients on their financial capacity growth measures increasingly 
became more positive. 
Bear in mind that, grounded in Markowitzs (1952) financial portfolio theory, revenue diversification is a 
risk reduction strategy that is based on the differential levels of volatility associated with each revenue 
stream. Furthermore, each funding stream generally requires different solicitation and fundraising 
competencies. In light of all of the above, this research uses the NCCS 990 Digitized Data to test 
whether different HHI measures significantly predict different levels of financial volatility (a measure of 
stability) and financial capacity (a measure of growth) two thematic areas that have dominated 
nonprofit research (Bowman 2011). 
Aggregation and Information Loss 
Nonprofit financing can be classified into varying macro and micro categories such as donations or 
contributions (as represented in the 990 form), which when disaggregated, may include donations 
from individual and from institutions like foundations, as well as government grants. Hence, the 
contributions variable would represent a reduced funding stream at the macro-level. In the same vein, 
government funding, includes funding from federal, state, and local government, which in turn can be 
disaggregated into grants, contracts, and cooperative agreements (Kerlin 2006), among other forms - 
all of which behave differently (Young 2006) and may generate different behaviors from nonprofit 
recipients of such funding (Chikoto 2015; Chikoto 2007; Kelman 2002; Kerlin 2006; Salamon 2002). 
The NCCS is a key source of data for studying nonprofits in the United States. Unless digitized, its 
datasets generally aggregate funding from individuals (from charitable donations, bequests, and other 
fundraising initiatives), foundations (independent and corporate), and government grants under one 
category of contributions. But in reality, each of these funding sources requires different fundraising 
and grant making techniques to acquire as they are influenced by diverse motivations and factors and 
hence, may impose diverse opportunities, demands, and restrictions on nonprofit organizations (see 
Chikoto 2015; Cordes and Sansing 2006; Rooney 2006; Rushton and Brooks 2006). In addition, each 
one of these sources might be subjected to unique volatility (Foster and Fine 2007; Froelich 1999; 
Mayer et al. 2012). 
The same is equally true about earned income and investment income. In fact, investment income has 
often been aggregated under the umbrella of earned income, and more recently, the NCCS classifies 
membership dues as a type of earned income. Again, the fact is that, earned income includes income 
earned from the sale of mission and non-mission-related goods and services (in the form of fees and 
funding from government contracts), as well as income generated from various other commercial 
ventures and corporate partnerships (see James and Young 2006). On the other hand, investment 
income includes interest, dividends, and capital gains generated from endowments and quasi-
endowments and the sale of assets (see Bowman et al. 2006). According to Mayer et al. (2012), 
investment income is a uniquely independent resource, (p. 15), one whose generation is not 
dependent on a nonprofits ability to market its goods and services while it is generated via different 
channels. Aggregation therefore, masks these differences by discarding information (Fan and Zhang 
2012; Orcutt et al. 1968). 
This raises questions about the types and number of funding streams that are included in the 
calculation of the revenue concentration index and whether the indices generated from such 
calculations influence results. Studies of biological, ecological, and population systems recognize that 
aggregation reduces the number of variables, which according to Sanz and Bravo de la Parra (1998), 
ignores the internal structure of phenomenon under scrutiny. Such simplification overlooks the 
possibility that the internal structure may have implications for everything else (Sanz and Bravo de la 
Parra 1998), especially since variables aggregation reduces the dimensionality necessary for predicting 
system dynamics (Shpak, Stadler, Wagner, and Hermisson 2004, 61). In the same logic, by aggregating 
a nonprofits revenue stream that is, relying on three or four compared to eleven, thirteen, or nineteen 
revenue streams in the construction of the revenue concentration index, the assumption one makes is 
that the internal structure provides no additional information. Our simple demonstration below does 
not support this assumption. 
For example, organization A has three revenue streams, 𝑅𝑅1 =  $1, 𝑅𝑅2 =  $49, and 𝑅𝑅3 =  $50, and 
total revenue 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 =  $100. If we aggregate the first two revenue streams and then calculate a HHI 
measure as the sum of the squared portion of total revenue, we would have HHI =
 (($1 ?  $49)/$100)2 ? ($50/$100)2 =  0.50. Organization B also has three revenue streams, 𝑅𝑅1 =
 $25, 𝑅𝑅2 =  $25, and 𝑅𝑅3 =  $50, and total revenue 𝑇𝑇𝑅𝑅 =  $100. Using the aggregated approach to 
calculate the HHI, we will have HHI =  (($25 ?  $25)/$100)2 ? ($50/$100)2 =  0.50. We would 
conclude that the two organizations are the same in terms of revenue concentration. Now let us use 
the disaggregated approach to calculate the HHI. For organization A, the HHI =  ($1/$100)2 ? ($49/
$100)2 ? ($50/$100)2 =  0.490. For organization B, the HHI =  ($25/$100)2 ? ($25/
$100)2 ? ($50/$100)2 =  0.375. The disaggregated measure helps us to see that organization B has 
a more diversified revenue strategy than organization A (where an HHI approaching 1 signifies 
concentration). This example illustrates that information is lost during the aggregation process. 
Apart from data limitations, revenue concentration indices have been calculated using five or fewer 
funding streams, without necessarily providing much justification or argument for the aggregation. This 
is where this research comes in, to test this assumption, in an effort to understand whether different 
aggregated and disaggregated measures of revenue concentration result in significantly different 
results. As Tuckman and Chang (1991) noted above, the HHI is designed to capture not only the 
number of revenue sources, but also the level of dispersion amongst them. As Orcutt et al. (1968) 
noted, aggregation can result in extreme loss of effective estimation and testing power, (773) giving us 
reason to be concerned. 
The current study also addresses which type of revenue sources may lead to more or less loss of 
information when aggregated. To address this, we focus on three categories of revenue: contributions, 
earned income, and investment income, primarily because these categories represent dominant 
fundraising structures or models in the nonprofit sector (Carroll and Stater 2009; Hansmann 1980). 
In addition, diversification in one’s revenue mixes and hence, resource dependence has been closely 
linked to one’s mission. For example, testing Youngs (2006) normative theory of nonprofit finance, 
Fischer et al. (2011) found that the more public a nonprofits services are, that is, services that are more 
collective in nature and hence, exhibit nonrivalry and nonexclubility qualities, the more likely the 
organization is to rely on donative income. The authors also found that nonprofits that generate a high 
proportion of their revenue from earned income are those that produce private benefits, that is, goods 
and services that can feasibly be sold on the marketplace without undermining nonprofit mission. 
Furthermore, commercial nonprofits have been found to display more concentrated revenue streams 
than donative nonprofits (Chang and Tuckman 1994). And compared to donative and earned income 
categories, investment income is by far the most volatile (Mayer et al. 2012, 15). 
Considering the relatively distinct nature of the three broad categories of revenue (contributions, 
earned income, and investment income), it becomes an empirical question whether revenue sources 
within each category are relatively more or less homogenous and whether this level of homogeneity 
leads to relatively more or less information loss and thus measurement error within the HHI. 
Data and Methods 
As noted earlier, in researching whether revenue concentration promotes growth in nonprofits 
financial capacity, Chikoto and Neely (2014) found discrepancies in the direction and magnitude of the 
results across the three revenue concentration measures they employed (based on whether three, 
four, or thirteen revenue sources were used). The authors inadvertently observed that the coefficients 
on their measures of financial capacity increasingly became more positive as the HHI became more 
comprehensive, suggesting that how one measures revenue concentration may alter the results. 
Hence, this research is mainly concerned with how the HHI is measured and whether different 
measurements yield significantly different results for predicting or estimating nonprofit financial 
health1. Such an examination is crucial given the widespread acceptance and use of the HHI in 
nonprofit research. As noted in the literature, nonprofit financial health is a two-dimensional concept 
which includes financial stability and capacity (Bowman 2011; Miller 2001, 2003). With this distinction 
in mind, this research explicitly tests whether different HHI measures produce significantly different 
financial volatility and financial capacity growth estimates. 
Using NCCS digitized 990 data (19982003), we employ Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) to test whether 
using aggregated measures (i.e., the three- or four-item revenue diversification measures) compared 
to more comprehensive measures (i.e., the seven- or thirteen-item revenue diversification measures), 
yield significantly different financial volatility and financial growth results. While the overall dataset 
included 1,388,480 observations, we deleted 94,962 returns led for special conditions such as 
termination, as well as dropped 34,183 group affiliated returns. We also deleted 14,755 observations 
because they had a scal year-end change. We thus limited observations to have all variables necessary 
to run the regressions. 
Finally, we made sure that the sample was the same for both our financial volatility and financial 
capacity tests, which limited the sample to 1 year of data (2003) due to the capacity growth measure 
requiring five (5) years of data. As a result, our final sample had 103,701 observations representing 
every National Taxonomy of Exempt Entities (NTEE) major code (A through Z). 
Table 1 shows the distribution of nonprofits by the count of revenue sources for the year 2003. 
Approximately, half of our sample collects income from more than four sources. And based on Table 2, 
the three most common revenue sources for our sample are direct public support (75 %), interest on 
investments (70 %), and program service revenue (65 %), which, respectively, reflects the three 
commonly used nonprofit revenue classifications of donative, investment, and earned income. 
Together, the results in Table 2 indicate that close to half of the organizations have some 
diversification within the three revenue categories. 
Although not surprising that many nonprofits have revenue diversification across these three revenue 
streams, the majority of the nonprofits in our sample demonstrated a tendency to diversify within one 
or more of these three streams. This provided us with an opportunity to test whether how we measure 
revenue diversification has different implications for nonprofits dependent on different types of 
funding models. Specifically, we performed the acid test using four scenarios. The first scenario 
includes an acid test of whether diversification measurement yields different results across our full 
sample of 103,701 nonprofits. 
As noted in the literature, nonprofits are particularly subject to resource dependency (Carroll and 
Stater 2009 p. 950), and reliance on any one revenue stream greatly influences its organizational 
structure and financial health (Brooks 2002; Hodge and Piccolo 2005; Weisbrod 1998). As such, the 
next three acid tests 
Table 1 Number of nonprofits by the count of revenue streams 
 
Number of revenue streams Number of nonprofits Percent of total Cumulative percent 
1 5080 4.90 4.90 
2 13,209 12.74 17.64 
3 19,239 18.55 36.19 
4 20,942 20.19 56.38 
5 18,349 17.69 74.08 
6 13,082 12.62 86.69 
7 7790 7.51 94.20 
8 3807 3.67 97.88 
9 1548 1.49 99.37 
10 510 0.49 99.86 
11 115 0.11 99.97 
12 28 0.03 100.00 
13 2 0.00 100.00 
Total 103,701 100.00  
 
Table 2 Percentage of nonprofits by the type of revenue stream 
 
Revenue stream Percentage of nonprofits with source (%) 
Direct public support 75 
Indirect public support 20 
Government grants 35 
Program service revenue 65 
Membership dues 24 
Interest on investments 70 
Dividends from securities 29 
Other investment income 6 
Net rental income‘ 13 
Net gain on sale of assets 12 
net income from special events 31 
Gross profit from sale of inventory 14 
Other revenue 40 
 
are based on three scenarios that reflect the nature of a nonprofit organizations resource-dependence, 
that is, whether its funding sources are predominantly diversified within donative, earned, or 
investment income. 
First, Donative-dependent reflects nonprofits with at least two of the following sources: direct public 
support, indirect public support, government grants, and/or net income from special events. In 
addition, donative-dependent nonprofits must have fewer than two earned income revenue streams 
and fewer than two investment income revenue streams. Second, Earned Income-dependent denotes 
a subgroup of nonprofits with at least two of the following sources: program revenue, membership 
dues, and/or other revenue. In addition, earned income-dependent nonprofits must have fewer than 
two donative income revenue streams and fewer than two investment income revenue streams. And 
finally, Investment Income-dependent contains a subgroup of nonprofits with at least two of the 
following sources: interest and savings, other investment income, and/or net gain from sale of assets. 
In addition, investment income-dependent nonprofits must have fewer than two donative income 
revenue streams and fewer than two earned income revenue streams. 
Dependent Variables 
Our first dependent variable is a measure of revenue volatility consistent with Carroll and Stater 
(2009). This is measured as the percentage of actual revenues deviated from predicted values. 
Specifically the following fixed effects model is first run: 
𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the log of total revenue, 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 represents a series of dummy variables for each organization, 
and 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 represents a series of time dummy variables. The residual from the model 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, represents the 
deviation of actual revenue from expected revenue. The predicted values from the model are then 
obtained and divided by the absolute residuals to generate the measure for revenue volatility. We run 
the model over all years of data in the dataset (1998-2003) and then use the results to obtain the 
revenue volatility measure in 2003 and the prior revenue volatility measure (in 2002) for our final 
sample. 
Carroll and Staters (2009) iteration of financial volatility is therefore calculated on the basis of the 
extent of the deviation between actual and expected revenue. Specifically, based on a revenue growth 
trend regression model, volatility is estimated as the percent deviation of the actual gross revenue 
from the expected revenue. According to the authors, this measure includes controls for fiscal years to 
account for potential prior revenue volatility, in addition to accounting for the unique total revenue 
growth trends for each organization. Our second dependent variable is similar to Chikoto and Neely 
(2014) and is measured as the five-year percentage growth in total revenues from 1998 to 2003 (line 
12 on the IRS 990 form). 
Independent Variables 
As indicated above, we model revenue diversification at four levels of aggregation; first, following 
Carroll and Stater (2009), the most aggregated measure �RDAggregated� is based on three revenue 
streams: contributions, investment income, and program revenue. Our second measure separates out 
government grants and includes four revenue streams following Yan et al. (2009): contributions, 
government grants, investment income, and program revenue (RDFourSource). Our third measure is 
based on seven revenue streams (RDSevenSource) identified as the streams most common in our 
sample: direct public support, government grants, program service revenue, interest on investments, 
dividends from securities, net income from special events, and other revenues (see Table 2). For our 
fourth measure, similar to Chikoto and Neely (2014), we include a comprehensive or disaggregated 
measure �RDcomprehensive� which includes thirteen revenue streams. 
These revenue streams are the break-down of the first line item and the other ten line items of the 
revenues on the Form 9902 This comprehensive measure takes advantage of the richness of the 
digitized data. The general form of the four measures is 
RD = �1 −� Ri2
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
� / [(𝑛𝑛 − 1)/𝑛𝑛], 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖 is the ratio of the revenue stream to total revenue; and 𝑛𝑛 is the number of revenue streams, 
which is 3, 4, 7, or 13 depending on the measure. This RD measure, a variation of HHI (i.e., RD =  (1 −
HHI)/[(𝑛𝑛 −  1)/𝑛𝑛)]), is widely used in nonprofit studies (e.g., Carroll and Stater 2009; Yan et al. 
2009). It is interpreted as follows: the higher the value of RD, the greater the level of revenue 
diversification3 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for our four HHI measures, as well as our two dependent 
variables; financial volatility and financial capacity growth. We observe differences in means across the 
four revenue diversification indices, with a greater dispersion across the medians. Consistent with 
expectations, the mean and median values of the indices are higher for the level of disaggregation 
(RDAggregated is the smallest with the largest value observed in RDComprehensive). In addition, the 
revenue volatility mean percentage of 2.1 % is similar to the 2.49 % reported in Carroll and Stater 
(2009). 
Table 3 also demonstrates that 24 % of the nonprofits had revenue diversity only within donative 
streams, 16 % of the nonprofits had revenue diversity only within earned revenue streams, with 4 % of 
the sample having revenue diversity only within investment-based revenue sources. This suggests that 
inferences derived from using the three source aggregation measure will provide less value to 
approximately 44 % of the organizations. A significant number of organizations could gain more 
insights when a revenue diversification measure looks into the details of the revenue sources. 
Control Variables 
In all financial volatility models, we control for similar variables utilized in the literature, in particular, 
Carroll and Stater (2009). These include prior financial volatility, organizational size (measured by total 
expenses), administrative and fundraising efficiency (measured as the ratio of administrative expenses 
to total expenses and fundraising expenses to total expenses, respectively), debt margin (total year-
end liabilities divided by total year-end assets), total margin (net surplus or deficit divided by total 
revenue), retained earnings (measured by net assets), age, and whether an organization was donative 
or not (whether the ratio of donations to total revenue is greater than 50 % or not). The controls for 
prior financial volatility and size are both found by Carroll and Stater (2009) to be significant and are 
therefore included in our model. 
Administrative and fundraising efficiency are included as it is expected that organizations that are less 
efficient are more financially troubled and are therefore more likely to experience greater financial 
volatility (Keating et al. 2005). Debt and total margins are included to control for the level of financial 
flexibility. Organizations that are more financially flexible are expected to be less financially volatile. 
Retained earnings are also included in the model since organizations with more retained earnings are 
expected to be financially healthier and thus experience less revenue volatility. In addition, we control 
for the age of the organization as we expect older organizations to be more revenue stable and thus 
less volatile. Recognizing that different revenue types behave differently and that organizations’ 
missions and geography often drive choices in revenue types, we also control for organizational sector 
or field, location, and whether an organization is primarily donative. 
Table 3 Summary statistics for variables of interest 
Variable Mean Median Sd Min Max N 
RDAggregated 0.31 0.23 0.29 0.00 0.99 103,701 
RDFourSource 0.33 0.29 0.28 0.00 0.99 103,701 
RDSevenSource 0.35 0.35 0.26 0.00 0.97 103,701 
RDComprehensive 0.35 0.36 0.26 0.00 0.93 103,701 
Voltperc 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.65 103,701 
fiveyrg_totalrev 0.82 0.25 22.5 -0.99 5,573 103,701 
Donative-dependent 0.24 0.00 0.43 0 1 103,701 
Earned income-dependent 0.16 0.00 0.36 0 1 103,701 
Investment Income- dependent 0.04 0.00 0.18 0 1 103,701 
Paired T tests reveal that the differences between RDaggregated and RDComprehensive are statistically 
different at 𝑝𝑝 < 0.001. Donative-dependent is defined as ‘‘1’’ if the organization has at least two of the following 
sources: direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and/or net income from special 
events. In addition the organization has one or zero earned income sources and one or zero investment income 
source. Earned Income-dependent is defined as ‘‘1’’ if the organization has at least two of the following sources: 
program revenue, membership dues, and/or other revenue. In addition the organization has one or zero 
donative income sources and one or zero investment income source. Investment Income-dependent is defined 
as ‘‘1’’ if the organization has at least two of the following sources: interest and savings, other investment 
income, and/or net gain from sale of assets. In addition the organization has one or zero donative sources and 
one or zero earned income sources 
 
For the financial capacity models, consistent with Chikoto and Neely (2014), we control for total 
revenue, fundraising and administrative efficiency, the age of the organization, the ratio of executive 
compensation to total compensation, whether an organization is primarily donative, as well as include 
controls for organization type and location. All independent variables for the financial capacity models 
are measured for the year 1998, since this is the base year for our dependent variable. Total revenue is 
included as a control in recognition that revenue growth rates are dependent in part on starting levels 
of revenue. Fundraising and administrative efficiency are included as we expect more efficient 
organizations to experience higher growth rates. Age is included in the model as we expect more 
mature organizations to have a slower rate of growth. We also control for the relative amount of the 
budget spent on executive compensation as we expect that organizations run by a relatively more 
professional executive team will experience higher growth rates. Finally, in recognition that revenue 
types can be expected to have different growth rates, and that mission and location often drive the 
choice of revenues, we also include controls for whether an organization is primarily donative, the 
organizations sector, and the organizations state of location. 
OLS Regression Results 
Table 4 provides a summary of our regression results, and Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 in the 
Appendix provide results for the detailed regression models. 
First, our models using the full sample - in predicting financial stability - show statistically insignificant 
results which are inconsistent with Carroll and Staters (2009) general findings that increasing ones level 
of revenue diversification reduces financial volatility and hence contributes to the financial stability of 
the organization. Our results show that the level of revenue diversification is not associated with the 
level of financial volatility. However, when assessing whether revenue concentration is associated with 
nonprofit financial growth, our results fully demonstrate the impact of information loss through 
aggregation. In this case, only the disaggregated measures (seven or thirteen sources) of revenue 
diversification yield statistically significant results4 compared to relying on the aggregated (three or 
four sources) HHI measure. 
Pertinent to our research, the results in Table 4 demonstrate the impact of information content 
between our diversification measures, with the disaggregated measures (RDSevenSource or 
RDComprehensive) capturing more detailed diversification information than the aggregated measures 
(RDAggregated or RDFourSource). Restricting our analysis to the three subsamples of nonprofits 
dependent on donative, earned, and investment income, respectively, yields revealing results on the 
impact of information loss due to aggregation. Recall that donative income-dependent nonprofits 
denote a subgroup of nonprofits dependent on at least two or more of the following sources: direct 
public support, indirect public support, government grants, and/or net income from special events, 
with fewer than two earned or investment income sources. In the same vein, earned income-
dependent nonprofits predominantly rely on at least two of the following sources: program revenue, 
membership dues, and/or other revenue, with the investment income-dependent subgroup relying on 
at least two or more of the following sources: interest and savings, other investment income, and/or 
net gain from sale of assets, and less on the others streams. 
Impact on Financial Volatility 
First, when dealing with predominantly donative income-dependent nonprofits, the comprehensive 
measure does not support a diversification strategy when trying to reduce financial volatility. The 
results in Table 4 show that while using the most aggregated diversification measure yields statistically 
significant results, using four, seven, or thirteen sources results in statistically insignificant findings. 
(For additional detail, also see Table 7). This suggests that using an aggregated measure overstates 
results, leading one to conclude that there is a relationship between revenue diversification and 
financial volatility when no relationship exists. 
Second, isolating the analysis only to earned income-dependent and investment income-dependent 
nonprofits, respectively, seem to confirm the first point above. The magnitude of the relationship is 
demonstrably understated (0.061 compared to 0.179 and -0.064 compared to 0.258, respectively, 
between the least and most aggregated HHI measures). In the case of investment income-dependent 
nonprofits, the direction of the relationship between revenue diversification and financial volatility not 
only changes, the results also become statistically significant. In fact, our comprehensive measure 
results suggest that increasing diversification within earned income or investment income increases 
financial volatility (For additional detail, also see Tables 8, 9). Our results are different from - Mayer et 
al.’s finding which focuses on the diversification cross the donative, earned, and investment income; 
instead, our results show the additional insights gained from looking into the details of the three 
income categories. 
Impact on Financial Capacity 
A similar story is also observed when assessing the impact of revenue concentration on nonprofit 
financial growth. As demonstrated in Table 4 (For additional detail, also see Tables 10, 11, 12), using an 
aggregated revenue diversification measure would lead us to conclude that there is no relationship 
between revenue concentration and financial capacity growth (as shown in the full model and when 
isolating the analysis only to investment income-dependent nonprofits). However, the results from the 
more disaggregated measures (RDSevenSource or RDComprehensive) tell a different story, one that is 
consistent with Chikoto and Neelys (2014) findings. 
In addition, focusing on the subsample of donative- and earned income-dependent nonprofits, we also 
observe noteworthy differences in the magnitude of the coefficients, thus further displaying the 
impact of information loss through aggregation. In two scenarios we observe that the aggregated 
revenue diversification measure understates 
Table 4 Summary OLS results predicting financial volatility & financial capacity growth 
 
RDAggregated -0.009 0.063* 0.061* -0.064 
RDFourSource 0.006 -0.023 0.217*** 0.057 
RDSevenSource 0.026 -0.006 0.146*** 0.230** 
RDComprehensive 0.015 -0.050 0.179*** 0.258** 
Dependent variable: 5-year revenue growth     
RDAggregated 0.004 -0.066*** -0.104*** 0.030 
RDFourSource -0.006 -0.096*** -0.167*** -0.050 
RDSevenSource -0.077*** -0.149*** -0.168*** -0.399*** 
RDComprehensive -0.074*** -0.159*** -0.201*** -0.450*** 
All models include robust standard errors 
* p\0.05, ** p\0.01, *** p\0.001 
 
the magnitude of financial growth when nonprofits concentrate their revenues streams (6.6 % 
compared to 15.9 % growth for donative-dependent nonprofits, and 10.4 % compared to 20.1 % 
growth for earned income-dependent nonprofits). 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Generally, the nature of nonprofit financial data has inadvertently predisposed nonprofit researchers 
to how to construct the revenue concentration index. Limited data on revenue streams meant the 
adoption of more aggregated measures of revenue concentration. However, the degree to which this 
impacted the results remained hitherto an unexplored or unquestioned issue. Building on Chikoto and 
Neelys (2014) suspicions, our results suggest that a loss of information occurs through aggregation and 
this in turn affects estimation results in important ways. Researchers and nonprofits are thus 
encouraged to evaluate the importance of the additional information disaggregated measures provide, 
in order to capture a more accurate picture of revenue diversification (concentration) and its potency 
as a strategy for financial health (growth). 
Overall, the preceding results demonstrate a number of issues that have implications for research 
utilizing the revenue concentration index. First, based on the results from the full sample, how the 
revenue diversification index is constructed not only might result in divergent results, it may also 
influence whether results are significant or not, as demonstrated in our test for financial growth. 
Hence, merely relying on the aggregated measure would result in a verdict of no relationship between 
revenue concentration and financial capacity growth. 
Second, if the theory of information loss due to aggregation is correct, then our results suggest that 
using aggregated measures of revenue diversification may misstate the magnitude and/or statistical 
significance of the findings as scenarios changes. While utilizing, our full sample demonstrates a 
modest impact of information loss, especially in the financial volatility model; breaking up our sample 
of nonprofits by their resource-dependence yielded results that allowed us a better understanding of 
the impact of information loss through aggregation. Hence, it becomes important for researchers to be 
well-acquainted with their data and the character of their sample of study. An ancillary benefit here 
may be the need to also be cognizant of the nature of revenue diversification among different 
nonprofit organizations as suggested by Young (2006) and others. 
With respect to the primary objective of this research, our results demonstrate that, revenue 
diversification measurement matters, that is, how one aggregates revenue streams in the calculation 
of the HHI, influences the direction and significance levels of ones estimates. In all, we believe there 
are important lessons here for nonprofit researchers, which brings us to our third observation; where 
magnitudes are important, caution should be exercised when interpreting results when using 
aggregated measures of revenue. 
Granted, due to cost restrictions, researchers have to choose between existing datasets with 
aggregated revenues or having to spend money to purchase more disaggregated data, or spend 
substantial number of hours hand collecting data. In light of the nature of the data available to 
researchers, work still needs to be done in establishing greater data specificity and in reclassifying data 
to capturing all, new, and different forms of revenue (Chang and Tuckman 2010). Finally, researchers 
and nonprofits need to be cautious when advocating a revenue diversification strategy. As shown 
above, when a nonprofit goes after diversification within a revenue stream (e.g., donative versus 
investment income), it may not get the normally believed results of lower revenue volatility. 
In general, aggregation forces otherwise nuanced revenue sources into a few revenue streams, thus 
resulting in important information loss, which in turn impacts results in regression analyses of variables 
of interest. Overall, this research supports the observation in the literature that different funding 
streams behave differently and they generate different consequences on nonprofits behavior. We nd 
that disaggregated measures respect this internal structure. 
Appendix 
Variable Denitions 
laglnvoltperc Lag of the natural log of volatility percentage 
laglnexpenses Lag of the natural log of total expenses 
lRDAggregated Lag of the HHI measure with three aggregated sources 
lRDFourSource Lag of the HHI measure with four aggregated sources 
lRDSevenSource Lag of the HHI measure with seven aggregated sources 
lRDComprehensive Lag of the HHI measure with thirteen sources 
ladmineff Lag of the ratio of administrative expenses to total expenses 
lage Lag of age defined as the current fiscal year minus the ruling year 
lfundeff Lag of the ratio of fundraising expenses to total expenses 
laglnnetassets Lag of the natural log of total net assets 
ltotalmargin Lag of the ratio of excess(deficit) income divided by total revenue 
ldebtmargin Lag of the ratio of total liabilities to total assets 
donative 1 if the ratio of donations to total revenue is greater than 50 % 
donative98 1 if the ratio of donations to total revenue is greater than 50 % in 1998 
revenue98 Total revenues in 1998 
adminexpratio98 Ratio of administrative expenses to total expenses in 1998 
age98 1998 Age (fiscal year–ruling year) 
frexpratio98 Ratio of fundraising expenses to total expenses in 1998 
compratio98 =Ratio of officer compensation to total expenses in 1998 
RDAggregated−98 1998 HHI measure with three aggregated sources 
RDFourSource−98 1998 HHI measure with four aggregated sources 
RDSevenSource−98 1998 HHI measure with seven aggregated sources 
RDComprehensive−98 1998 HHI measure with thirteen sources 
Additional controls dummy variables for state of location and NTEE Major GroupCode (A to Z) 
 
See Tables 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12. 
Table 5 Regression model with the natural log of volatility percentage 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
laglnvoltperc 0.350*** 0.350*** 0.350*** 0.350*** 
laglnexpenses -0.134*** -0.133*** -0.133*** -0.133*** 
ladmineff 0.057** 0.057** 0.054** 0.055** 
lage -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
lfundeff 0.153*** 0.152*** 0.150*** 0.151*** 
laglnnetassets 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.059*** 
ltotalmargin -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
ldebtmargin 0.107*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.107*** 
donative 0.110*** 0.109*** 0.108*** 0.109*** 
lRDAggregated -0.009    
lRDFourSource  0.006   
lRDSevenSource   0.026  
lRDComprehensive    0.015 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -1.793*** -1.797*** -1.805*** -1.801*** 
N 103,701 103,701 103,701 103,701 
adj. R2 0.243 0.243 0.243 0.243 
All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that have a 
Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers until the 
median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See StataCorp 
(2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 6 Regression model with 5-year revenue growth 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
revenue98 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
adminexpratio98 -0.075*** -0.073*** -0.059*** -0.060*** 
age98 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
frexpratio98 -0.368*** -0.367*** -0.354*** -0.356*** 
compratio98 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.126*** 0.126*** 
donative98 0.015*** 0.016*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 
RDAggregated−98 0.004    
RDFourSource−98  -0.006   
RDSevenSource−98   -0.077***  
RDComprehensive−98    -0.078*** 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons  0.313*** 0.316*** 0.340*** 0.339*** 
N  103,701 103,701 103,701 103,701 
adj. R2  0.029 0.029 0.030 0.030 
All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that have a 
Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers until the 
median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See Statacorp 
(2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p <0.001 
 
Table 7 Regression model with the natural log of volatility percentage as the dependent variable and 
organizations with At least 2 donative funding sources and fewer than 2 earned income and 
investment funding sources 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
laglnvoltperc 0.315*** 0.314*** 0.315*** 0.314*** 
laglnexpenses -0.127*** -0.129*** -0.129*** -0.131*** 
lRDAggregated 0.063*    
lRDFourSource  -0.023   
lRDSevenSource   -0.006  
lRDComprehensive    -0.050 
ladmineff 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.016 
lage -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
lfundeff 0.251** 0.243** 0.249** 0.249** 
laglnnetassets 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 
ltotalmargin -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 
ldebtmargin 0.169*** 0.171*** 0.171*** 0.170*** 
donative 0.166*** 0.153*** 0.153*** 0.155*** 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -2.047*** -2.013*** -2.020*** -1.993*** 
N 25,175 25,175 25,175 25,175 
adj. R2 0.202 0.202 0.202 0.202 
Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net 
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other 
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of 
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that 
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers 
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See 
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 8 Regression model with the natural log of volatility percentage as the dependent variable and 
organizations with at least 2 earned funding sources and fewer than 2 donative income and investment 
funding sources 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
laglnvoltperc 0.372*** 0.370*** 0.372*** 0.371*** 
laglnexpenses -0.087*** -0.082*** -0.083*** -0.080*** 
lRDAggregated 0.061*    
lRDFourSource  0.217***   
lRDSevenSource   0.146***  
lRDComprehensive    0.179*** 
ladmineff 0.089 0.048 0.063 0.055 
lage -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
lfundeff 0.161 0.116 0.149 0.143 
laglnnetassets 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.030*** 0.028*** 
ltotalmargin -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
ldebtmargin 0.069* 0.061 0.069* 0.067* 
donative 0.147*** 0.120*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -1.934*** -1.953*** -1.983*** -2.018*** 
N 16,298 16,298 16,298 16,298 
adj. R2 0.241 0.242 0.241 0.242 
Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net 
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other 
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of 
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that 
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers 
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See 
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 9 Regression model with the natural log of volatility percentage as the dependent variable and 
organizations with at least 2 investment funding sources and fewer than 2 earned income and donative 
funding sources 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
laglnvoltperc 0.306*** 0.307*** 0.307*** 0.306*** 
laglnexpenses -0.153*** -0.151*** -0.141*** -0.140*** 
lRDAggregated 0.064    
lRDFourSource  0.057   
lRDSevenSource   0.230**  
lRDComprehensive    0.258** 
laglnnetassets 0.074*** 0.071*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 
ltotalmargin 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 
ldebtmargin -0.049 -0.047 -0.039 -0.043 
donative 0.041 0.032 0.037 0.040 
Additional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -1.967*** -1.995*** -2.086*** -2.097*** 
N 3,603 3,603 3,603 3,603 
adj. R2 0.261 0.261 0.263 0.263 
 
Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net 
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other 
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of 
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that 
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers 
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See 
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 10 Regression model with 5-year revenue growth as the dependent variable and organizations 
with at least 2 donative funding sources and fewer than 2 earned income and investment funding 
sources 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
revenue98 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
adminexpratio98 -0.103*** -0.092*** -0.083*** -0.083*** 
age98 -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
frexpratio98 -0.502**** -0.511*** -0.483*** -0.486*** 
compratio98 0.255*** 0.262*** 0.262*** 0.268*** 
donative98 -0.009 0.006 0.012 0.013 
RDAggregated−98 -0.066***    
RDFourSource−98  -0.096***   
RDSevenSource−98   -0.149***  
RDComprehensive−98    -0.159*** 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.430*** 0.434*** 0.445*** 0.448*** 
N 25,175 25,175 25,175 25,175 
adj. R2 0.034 0.035 0.037 0.037 
Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net 
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other 
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of 
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that 
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers 
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See 
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 11 Regression model with 5-year revenue growth as the dependent variable and organizations 
with at least 2 earned funding sources and fewer than 2 donative income and investment funding 
sources 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
revenue98 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
adminexpratio98 -0.034 -0.003 -0.008 -0.001 
age98 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** 
frexpratio98 -0.452*** -0.422*** -0.441*** -0.436*** 
compratio98 0.108* 0.124** 0.112* 0.108* 
donative98 -0.045*** -0.028** -0.048*** -0.048*** 
RDAggregated−98 -0.104***    
RDFourSource−98  -0.167***   
RDSevenSource−98   -0.168***  
RDComprehensive−98    -0.201*** 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.203** 0.195** 0.222*** 0.234*** 
N 16,298 16,298 16,298 16,298 
adj. R2 0.028 0.031 0.031 0.032 
Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net 
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other 
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of 
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that 
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers 
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See 
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 12 Regression model with 5-year revenue growth as the dependent variable and organizations 
with at least 2 investment funding sources and fewer than 2 earned income and donative funding 
sources 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
revenue98 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
adminexpratio98 -0.095* -0.094* -0.089* -0.086* 
age98 -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 
frexpratio98 0.100 0.109 0.137 0.139 
compratio98 -0.123 -0.142 -0.129 -0.127 
donative98 0.078** 0.083*** 0.044 0.035 
RDAggregated−98 0.030    
RDFourSource−98  -0.050   
RDSevenSource−98   -0.399***  
RDComprehensive−98    -0.450*** 
Additional controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
_cons 0.225 0.264 0.413 0.437 
N 3,603 3,603 3,603 3,603 
adj. R2  0.036 0.037 0.058 0.061 
Donative funding sources include direct public support, indirect public support, government grants, and net 
income from special events. Earned income funding includes program revenue, membership dues, and other 
revenue. Investment funding includes interest and savings, other investment income, net gain from sale of 
assets. All models include robust regressions. Utilizing the STATA procedure rreg, observations are dropped that 
have a Cooks D value greater than 1. The procedure then performs an iterative process down weighing outliers 
until the median absolute deviation for the residuals is no more than 7 times the median residual value. See 
StataCorp (2011) for further information on the rreg procedure* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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